U.N. Ends Yemen Port Monitoring Mission in Hudaydah, Shifting Cease-Fire Oversight to Diplomats

The blue flag comes down

The blue flag came down quietly in Hudaydah.

On March 31, a small team of unarmed United Nations observers packed up their compound in the Yemeni port city and stopped the patrols that, for seven years, had symbolized the international community’s most visible effort to keep one of the world’s most fragile cease-fires from collapsing.

Their departure followed a Security Council decision in January to grant the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement, known as UNMHA, a final, two‑month mandate that expired at the end of March. As of April 1, the mission’s work shifted into liquidation mode, effectively ending on‑the‑ground UN monitoring of the 2018 cease‑fire around Yemen’s most important Red Sea port.

For a country still at war—and for a waterway now at the center of a global shipping crisis—the decision marks a significant change in how the United Nations is willing, and able, to operate.

Security Council vote and the drawdown plan

On Jan. 27, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2813, extending UNMHA “for a final period of two months, until 31 March 2026,” and calling for an “effective, efficient and safe drawdown” with liquidation to begin April 1. The text, drafted by the United Kingdom, passed with 13 votes in favor and two abstentions from China and Russia.

The resolution directs that any remaining tasks be folded into the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, shifting the focus from a specialized field mission based in Hudaydah to a leaner, largely diplomatic presence operating away from the front lines.

UN Secretary‑General António Guterres’ office confirmed on March 31 that UNMHA “will cease its operations today, in accordance with resolution 2813,” while stressing that the organization “remains committed to supporting the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement” through political channels.

A mission born from the Stockholm Agreement

The closure ends a mission born out of emergency talks in Stockholm, Sweden, in late 2018, when government‑aligned forces were advancing on Hudaydah and aid agencies were warning of famine if a full‑scale battle engulfed the ports.

The Stockholm Agreement, concluded on Dec. 13, 2018, between Yemen’s internationally recognized government and the Houthi movement, included three strands:

• a cease‑fire and redeployments in Hudaydah governorate;
• a nationwide prisoner exchange; and
• steps to ease the siege in the city of Taiz.

The Hudaydah component called for a governorate‑wide cease‑fire, mutual redeployment of forces out of Hudaydah city and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ras Isa, and a strengthened UN role in supporting the civilian operation of the ports.

Days later, the Security Council authorized an advance monitoring team. In January 2019 it established UNMHA as a special political mission tasked with leading a Redeployment Coordination Committee of both sides, monitoring the cease‑fire and redeployments, and helping preserve the “civilian character” of the ports.

The mission was tiny by UN standards—a few dozen military observers, police and civilians—but its presence helped formalize the truce that halted the battle for Hudaydah. For years, its white vehicles and small patrol boats were among the few international fixtures in a city otherwise under Houthi control.

Constraints tighten and skepticism grows

Over time, UNMHA’s room to operate narrowed sharply.

UN reports to the Security Council described what the Secretariat called an “extremely restrictive environment.” Houthi authorities repeatedly blocked patrols, delayed clearances and limited UNMHA’s ability to access key areas in and around the ports, according to those briefings. Government‑aligned forces also fortified positions in violation of the spirit of the agreement.

At one point, the United Nations recorded an average of more than 100 cease‑fire violations per day in Hudaydah governorate, including exchanges of fire, shelling and the laying of new land mines.

The political context deteriorated as well. Starting in 2025, Houthi security forces carried out raids on UN premises in Sana’a and other areas and detained scores of UN and aid organization staff. By early 2026, senior UN officials said 69 UN personnel were still being held by the group. Humanitarian agencies warned that the detentions, combined with bureaucratic restrictions, were eroding their ability to work in the north.

That pattern of obstruction fed growing skepticism among Western Council members about the value of keeping an exposed field mission in place.

In July 2025, the Council renewed UNMHA’s mandate through Resolution 2786 but, for the first time, explicitly asked the secretary‑general to review the mission’s “future viability and sunsetting.” During that debate, U.S. diplomats argued that UNMHA had “outlived its usefulness” and that the Council needed to consider ending it if conditions did not improve.

Divided reactions at the U.N.

When Resolution 2813 came up for a vote in January, the United Kingdom—the Council’s lead on Yemen—made clear it saw little prospect of the mission regaining meaningful access.

British Deputy Permanent Representative Archie Young praised UNMHA staff who had “worked tirelessly since 2019, especially in the face of continued Houthi restrictions which inhibited the Mission’s ability to fulfill its mandate,” according to his statement after the vote. The final, time‑limited renewal, he said, would allow for an orderly drawdown while shifting attention to the broader peace process and maritime security in the Red Sea.

The Yemeni government, headquartered in Aden and represented internationally by a Presidential Leadership Council, publicly welcomed the decision.

In a statement titled “UNSC to End Mandate of UN Mission Supporting Hodeidah Agreement by End of March,” the Foreign Ministry said 13 Council members had backed the move, with Russia and China abstaining. It blamed what it called “Houthi intransigence” for rendering UNMHA ineffective, and argued that the mission’s presence had failed to curb Houthi consolidation of power and revenue in Hudaydah.

Government officials have long been critical of the Stockholm deal itself. As early as 2020, senior figures were describing the agreement as “unenforceable” and accusing it of freezing the front lines in a way that prevented government forces from retaking the port while allowing the Houthis to entrench.

Houthi officials did not issue a detailed public response to Resolution 2813 in English. The group has previously rejected accusations of obstruction, accusing Western states and the Yemeni government of politicizing UN mechanisms. Houthi‑aligned media have criticized moves to fold UNMHA’s functions into the special envoy’s office as an attempt to centralize pressure on the movement.

Russia and China, the only two Council members to abstain, argued that the field mission still had value.

Russia’s deputy permanent representative, Anna Evstigneeva, told the Council her country “did not block the adoption” of the resolution because Yemen’s government and some regional partners had called for it. But she said Moscow disagreed with the narrative that UNMHA was ineffective, describing it as playing “an important stabilising role” with “relevant functions,” including monitoring the Stockholm Agreement, supporting mine clearance and helping preserve the civilian character of Hudaydah, Salif and Ras Isa.

China voiced similar concerns about terminating a stabilizing presence in a strategic waterway while missile and drone attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el‑Mandeb Strait remain frequent.

What changes in Hudaydah—and why it matters

For aid agencies and commercial shippers, the question now is what will happen to Hudaydah without any international monitors on the ground.

The port and its sister facilities at Salif and Ras Isa handle roughly 70% to 80% of Yemen’s commercial imports and humanitarian supplies for the north, according to UN estimates. Yemen imports the vast majority of its food, fuel and medicine. Any major disruption to Red Sea port operations would have immediate nationwide consequences.

The humanitarian response is already under strain. The UN’s 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen seeks about $2.9 billion to assist more than 20 million people. By late March, pledges covered only a fraction of that requirement. Organizations working on the ground report rising levels of hunger and warn that further shocks could tip parts of the country toward famine‑like conditions.

Without UNMHA, there is no longer a dedicated UN body mandated to patrol Hudaydah’s front lines, verify cease‑fire violations or monitor demilitarization of the ports. Those tasks now fall, at best, to the warring parties themselves, local civil society groups and whatever information the Special Envoy’s office can gather from afar.

Some Yemeni and regional commentators close to the government see an opportunity to revisit—or even abandon—the Stockholm framework, potentially opening the way to a new military push toward Hudaydah. Others fear that the Houthis, no longer subject to daily UN presence, will feel freer to move fighters and materiel around the ports or to plant new mines in surrounding areas.

A local cease-fire amid a wider Red Sea confrontation

The mission’s closure also comes as the Red Sea has become a broader theater of confrontation.

Since late 2023, Houthi forces have carried out a series of missile and drone attacks on foreign‑flagged commercial ships, saying they are targeting vessels linked to Israel, the United States and their allies in response to the war in Gaza. Several sailors have been killed, and at least two cargo ships—including the Magic Seas and Eternity C—have sunk after being struck.

Those attacks prompted Western naval deployments and separate Security Council resolutions focused on protecting freedom of navigation. But those measures operate far from Hudaydah’s quays, underscoring a shift in the international response from ground‑based conflict management to offshore deterrence and sanctions.

What remains after the mission

UNMHA’s liquidation is expected to run through the end of June, as the organization sells off assets, closes contracts and reassigns staff. After that, there will be little trace of a mission that, for nearly a decade, sat at the intersection of a local war and global trade.

The Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, will continue to shuttle between capitals and Yemeni factions in an effort to broker a broader political settlement. His office says it will “support the parties in implementing their commitments” under the Hudaydah Agreement, but it will do so without its own eyes and ears in the city that agreement was built to protect.

For residents of Hudaydah, the implications may only become clear over time. The UN did not end its monitoring mission because peace had taken hold, but because access dwindled and political patience wore thin. If the guns stay quiet and the cranes keep moving, the decision to withdraw the blue flag could fade into the background of Yemen’s long war. If they do not, the absence of those unarmed observers will be harder to ignore.