ELN Announces Three-Day Ceasefire as Colombia Heads to March 8 Elections

On a winding road in northern Cauca, where campaign posters share space with graffiti from armed groups, the signs of Colombia’s election season are easy to miss. A few days ago, Indigenous senator Aida Quilcué was briefly kidnapped while traveling this route. Now, as parties race toward the March 8 congressional elections, the country’s largest remaining guerrilla group says it will fall silent so Colombians can vote.

ELN declares unilateral pause

The National Liberation Army, or ELN, has announced a unilateral ceasefire from midnight March 7 to midnight March 10, framing the move as a gesture of respect for the “free right to vote.” The group says it will halt offensive operations against state security forces and will not interfere with the balloting.

Authorities and electoral observers welcome anything that might lower the risk of clashes on election day. But data from independent monitoring groups and a wave of recent attacks underscore a stark reality: even if the guns go quiet for three days, much of Colombia will still vote under the shadow of armed groups that shape who can campaign, who dares to vote and, in some places, whether elections happen at all.

The ELN first made its ceasefire announcement public around Feb. 23, through its own channels and Colombian media. In a subsequent communiqué titled “Hechos de Paz,” public by March 1, the group’s leadership set the precise window: from 12:00 a.m. on March 7 to 12:00 a.m. on March 10.

The vote is scheduled for March 8, when Colombians will elect a new Congress and take part in inter-party presidential primaries. The first round of the presidential election is set for May 31.

“During the electoral processes of the last four governments, the ELN has carried out ceasefires unilaterally,” the group said. “Therefore, we will continue acting in correspondence with our policy in favor of the people and their freedom of action.”

The ELN stressed that it does not present candidates, fund campaigns or control electoral bodies. “We do not control or direct the organs or institutions of the electoral system… We are not an electoral organization, we do not present our own candidates nor finance campaigns,” the statement said. The group said citizens should vote “for whom they think is best, or to abstain if they feel that is most appropriate.”

At the same time, the guerrilla leadership used the message to question whether elections can resolve what it calls Colombia’s “structural crisis” and to revive its proposal for a broad “National Accord” to be discussed with the next president and Congress. It sharply criticized President Gustavo Petro’s flagship “Total Peace” policy, describing it as a failed counterinsurgency plan allegedly guided by the Pentagon and implemented with paramilitary groups.

Government keeps security plans in place

The government has not issued a single formal response embracing or rejecting the ceasefire. But officials have made clear it will not alter security preparations.

Peace talks between Petro’s administration and the ELN were suspended in January 2025 after heavy fighting in the Catatumbo region, in Norte de Santander department, between the ELN and other armed groups. Dozens of people were killed and tens of thousands displaced. Petro accused the guerrillas of “war crimes” and said they had shown no will for peace.

Since then, security forces have continued offensive operations. In late February, authorities in Bogotá said they had dismantled an explosives workshop allegedly linked to the ELN, which they claimed could have supplied devices for attacks around the March 8 vote.

“Any announcement that reduces violence is positive,” one senior security official said publicly in late February. “But the state’s duty is to guarantee security for all citizens, and that cannot depend on the will of illegal armed groups.”

Observers warn of wider risks: violence and fraud

Electoral observers say the risks extend far beyond potential clashes between the ELN and the military.

The independent Electoral Observation Mission, known by its Spanish initials MOE, identified 170 municipalities where risks of electoral fraud and political violence overlap for the 2026 national elections. Of those, 81 are classified as in “extreme risk,” 51 as high and 38 as medium—an increase from 131 such municipalities in 2022.

Separately, MOE found 339 municipalities—about 30% of the country—where the risk tied specifically to violence is elevated. In that group, 126 are in extreme risk, 74 high and 139 medium. Excluding Bogotá, the 170 municipalities facing combined violence and fraud risks are home to roughly 4.5 million registered voters, or about 11% of the electorate.

The Ombudsman’s Office, which issues early warnings about human rights risks, has gone further, flagging more than 600 municipalities with some level of electoral risk linked to the presence of armed groups, drug economies and weak state institutions.

International monitors have also noted the deterioration. The United Nations human rights office reported an 85% increase in forced displacement in Colombia in 2025, with around 94,000 people forced from their homes, and documented a rise in attacks on human rights defenders. It also recorded the killing of 18 political leaders last year, including conservative presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe, who was shot during a rally in Bogotá in 2025 and died two months later—the first assassination of a presidential contender in roughly three decades.

Attacks on candidates and officials

Those numbers are reflected on the campaign trail.

• In February, Indigenous senator Aida Quilcué was kidnapped in Cauca while traveling with her security team. She was later released, and the details remain under investigation, but the episode added to fears of political targeting in one of the country’s most conflict-affected regions.
• In eastern Colombia, two bodyguards assigned to Senator Jairo Castellanos were killed when gunmen opened fire on his convoy. Authorities said the attackers were alleged ELN fighters and that the caravan had refused to stop at an illegal roadblock. The ELN later claimed it did not intend to attack the senator but targeted only the vehicle.
• Two congressional candidates—Indigenous leader Ana Guetio in Cauca and conservative Senate candidate Andrés Vásquez in another region—disappeared in separate incidents in late February. Both cases are being treated by authorities as possible forced disappearances or kidnappings.

The violence is not limited to rural areas. MOE and allied organizations have classified Bogotá as at “extreme risk” for both violence and fraud ahead of the March vote, citing Uribe’s assassination, a rise in attacks on journalists and entrenched clientelist networks in poor southern districts such as Ciudad Bolívar and Usme. The reported discovery of an ELN-linked explosives facility in the capital has reinforced concerns about urban terrorism.

A vote held under armed-group pressure

Beyond these individual cases, armed groups continue to exert territorial control over parts of the Pacific coast, northern Cauca, Catatumbo, southern Meta, Caquetá, Guaviare and Putumayo, among other regions. Local officials and observers report threats, road blockades and strict limits on campaign activities. In some communities, politicians can only enter with permission from whoever controls the area. In others, residents are pressured on which parties can campaign or are warned not to vote at all.

“The danger is not only that someone will fire a gun at a polling station,” a MOE coordinator in the southwest said publicly in February. “It is that entire communities have been told for months who can or cannot participate, and under what conditions.”

The ELN insists it does not seek to control electoral institutions or hold formal state power. Founded in 1964 with a Marxist-Leninist ideology inspired by the Cuban Revolution and liberation theology, the group has long rejected transforming itself into a legal political party, unlike the former FARC guerrillas who signed a peace deal in 2016.

Today, the ELN is estimated to have between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters and operates in more than 200 municipalities, with cross-border networks into Venezuela. Its federated command structure gives local fronts significant autonomy, which analysts say complicates enforcing any centralized ceasefire order. The group finances itself through kidnapping, extortion, participation in drug trafficking and control of illegal mining, according to Colombian and international reports.

This is not the first time the ELN has declared a truce around elections. It announced unilateral ceasefires for the 2018 congressional and presidential votes and has occasionally halted attacks around Christmas and other national events. Even then, observers documented continuing violence in several regions and noted that other armed actors—including FARC dissident factions and criminal organizations—filled any temporary vacuum.

A test for Petro’s “Total Peace”

For Petro, the March 8 vote is a crucial test. His “Total Peace” policy, launched with a 2022 law, sought to negotiate simultaneously with guerrilla groups, FARC dissidents and major criminal organizations through a mix of political talks and conditional surrender deals. A bilateral ceasefire with the ELN began in 2023 but quickly came under strain, amid continued attacks and accusations that armed groups were using the lull to recruit and expand control.

Human rights organizations have argued that in some areas, these ceasefires allowed illegal actors to deepen their grip over communities without offering effective protection to civilians.

The ELN’s latest ceasefire, coming after the collapse of formal talks and timed to a pivotal national vote, highlights a central tension: while the state is formally responsible for guaranteeing free and fair elections, in large swaths of the country it is armed groups that decide when, how and under what terms politics can be practiced.

On March 8, Colombians in cities and remote villages alike are expected to line up at polling stations, escorted in many places by soldiers and police. If the ELN holds its fire, the day itself could be calmer than the campaign that preceded it. But in places like northern Cauca, where posters fade quickly and memories of recent attacks linger, few believe three days of silence will determine who truly holds power long after the ballots are counted.